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Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire
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any nuclear bomb. But without a doubt,
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if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we
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will follow suit as soon as possible.
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The rivalry between Iran and Saudi
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Arabia has taken a turn for the worse.
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What used to be a cold war is now
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starting to look a lot hotter. In just
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the past few weeks, Iranian missiles and
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drones have slammed toward Saudi oil
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ports and air bases, damaging places
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like Ras Tanura and the eastern
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province. With Saudi Arabia on fire,
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Riyad has angrily come right out and
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said that trust with Thran is completely
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gone. Reports also say Crown Prince
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Muhammad bin Salman has been talking
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privately with President Trump, urging
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him not to settle for half measures, but
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to burn Iran to the ground. This isn't
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about containment anymore. It's about
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destruction. To understand where this is
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going, you have to step back and trace
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how a revolution that happened decades
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ago has transformed into dead civilians
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in Saudi Arabia's al-Qian
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officials being kicked out of the
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country as enemies of the state. Before
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1979, Iran and Saudi Arabia were rivals.
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But it was the kind of rivalry you can
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manage. There was tension, there was
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competition, but there were also clear
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limits. Iran under the Sha was closely
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aligned with the United States, and so
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was Saudi Arabia. Both countries sat on
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the same side of the table when it came
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to American strategy in the Gulf. They
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competed for influence, for prestige,
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for economic leverage, but it never felt
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like a zero- sum fight. Neither side
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believed the other was trying to erase
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it from the map. Then 1979 hit, and
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everything changed almost overnight. The
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Iranian revolution did not just swap one
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leader for another. It transformed the
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entire identity of the state. Iran was
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no longer operating like a typical
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country focused on borders and
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stability. It rebranded itself as a
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revolutionary force built on the idea
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that its model should not stay inside of
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Iran. The new leadership in Tehran saw
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its system as something meant to spread,
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something meant to reshape the region
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around it. That is where the tension
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really started to sharpen. Because from
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Riyad's perspective, this was not just a
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shift in policy. It was a direct
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challenge to the entire order they
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relied on. Saudi Arabia was not just
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another state in the region. It was a
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monarchy deeply tied to religion. Built
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on its role as the guardian of Sunni
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Islam and the protector of Mecca and
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Medina. Now suddenly Iran was stepping
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forward and positioning itself as the
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voice of Shia Muslims worldwide,
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offering an alternative model that
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directly competed with Saudi legitimacy.
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So what had once been a controlled
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rivalry quickly turned into something
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much deeper. It stopped being about
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trade routes or regional influence and
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became ideological at its core. The
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sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia
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Islam moved to the front. But even that
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was often used as a political tool
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rather than purely a religious one.
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Underneath it all was a simple reality
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both sides understood. This was becoming
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a contest neither could afford to lose.
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And once you reach that point where both
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sides see the stakes as existential, the
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rules change. Iran was no longer just
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acting like a country. It started
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behaving like a movement, like a cause
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that stretched beyond its borders. And
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Saudi Arabia, whether it wanted to or
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not, found itself cast as the main
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barrier standing in its way.
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>> But I've seen that you called the
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Ayatollah Kami the new Hitler of the
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Middle East.
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>> Absolutely.
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>> Why?
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>> Because he wants to expand. He wants to
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create his own project in the Middle
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East. Very much like Hitler who wanted
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to expand at the time. Many countries
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around the world and in Europe did not
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realize how dangerous Hitler was until
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what happened happened. I don't want to
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see the same events happening in the
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Middle East. From there, it was only a
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matter of time before the rivalry
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spilled beyond their borders and into
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the rest of the region. The first real
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explosion came in 1980, pulling the
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rivalry out of the shadows and into open
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conflict. The Iran Iraq war turned Iraq
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under Saddam Hussein into the front line
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against Iran's revolutionary push. Saudi
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Arabia stepped in on Iraq's side, not
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because it trusted Saddam or shared his
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vision, but because it feared what Iran
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had become. From Riyad's perspective,
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stopping Iran mattered more than
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anything else. And from Thran's point of
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view, that changed everything. Saudi
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Arabia was no longer just a rival
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watching from a distance. It was now
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actively backing Iran's enemies. That
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shift hardened attitudes on both sides
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and made the conflict far more personal.
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At the same time, another layer of
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pressure began to build, one that did
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not involve tanks or missiles. Oil
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became a weapon. Saudi Arabia had the
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ability to adjust production and
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influence global prices which gave it a
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powerful economic lever. Iran already
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stretched by war and cut off in many
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ways did not have that same flexibility.
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So when the fighting drained Iran on the
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battlefield, economic pressure squeezed
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it from the outside. It was a onew punch
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that made the rivalry even more intense.
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Then the tension hit one of the most
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sensitive areas imaginable. In 1987
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during the Hajj in Mecca, clashes broke
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out between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi
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security forces. What should have been a
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sacred journey turned into chaos. Over
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400 pilgrims were killed, most of them
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Iranians. The reaction was immediate and
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emotional. Embassies were attacked.
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Anger spilled into the streets and
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diplomatic ties between the two
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countries collapsed. At that point, the
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conflict stopped being just political or
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military. It reached into religion
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itself and into the lives of ordinary
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people. Families lost loved ones during
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what was meant to be a moment of faith
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and unity. That kind of loss does not
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fade quickly. It lingers and it deepens
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resentment across entire communities.
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For a brief stretch after that, things
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seemed to cool down. Through the 1990s
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and the early 2000s, there were
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diplomatic visits, security agreements,
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and attempts to stabilize the
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relationship. On the surface, it looked
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like progress was being made. Like both
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sides were stepping back from the edge,
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but underneath the core issues were
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still there, untouched. There was no
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real agreement on who should lead the
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region. No shared vision for the future
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and no compromise on ideology. The
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rivalry had not ended, it had just gone
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quiet. The ice may have softened, but
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the fire underneath was still burning.
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Then 2003 arrived, and the entire
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picture shifted again. The United States
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launched the Iraq war and removed Saddam
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Hussein from power who was later
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executed in 2006. On paper, it looked
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like the fall of a dictator. In reality,
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it removed a key buffer that had been
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holding Iran back from deeper influence
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in the Arab world. What followed changed
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the region in ways few expected. A
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Shiialled government emerged in Baghdad,
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and Iran moved quickly to build
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influence through political alliances,
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militia networks, and economic ties.
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Within a few years, Thran had a level of
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reach inside Iraq that would have been
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almost unthinkable before the invasion.
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From Saudi Arabia's perspective, this
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was a nightmare unfolding in slow
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motion. What they saw was not just Iran
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gaining influence here and there, but a
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deliberate strategy that seemed to be
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knitting together a belt of Shia power
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across the region. Step by step, Tehran
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was building what many began to call a
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Shia crescent, stretching from Iran
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through Iraq into Syria and finally
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Lebanon. And this is where the rivalry
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takes on a sharper edge. The sectarian
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divide was no longer just about identity
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or belief. It became a tool, something
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both sides could use to mobilize
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support, justify their actions, and
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deepen divisions across the region. The
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shift did not just reshape Iraq. It
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tilted the balance of power across the
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entire Middle East. And once states
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began to weaken under that pressure, the
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rivalry found new places to play out,
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turning fragile countries into
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battlegrounds. This is the point where
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the rivalry fully moved into the open
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and became impossible to ignore. It
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shifted into its most visible form,
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proxy wars. Iran built what it called
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the axis of resistance. A network of
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allied groups and militias spread across
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the region. Instead of sending large
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armies, Thran leaned into something more
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flexible. Weapons, training, funding,
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and guidance flowed outward. And in
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return, those groups acted as forward
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pressure points. It was a lowcost
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strategy with high impact. Iran extended
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its reach without exposing itself
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directly while Saudi Arabia was forced
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to stay alert across multiple fronts.
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Saudi Arabia responded by tightening its
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alignment with the United States and
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this is where the rivalry started to
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scale beyond the region. Riyad opened
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key bases like King Fad air base to
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American forces especially during the
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Gulf War. By the 1990s, thousands of US
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troops were stationed on Saudi soil,
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embedding American military presence
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directly into the kingdom's defense
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structure. At the same time, Saudi
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Arabia poured massive resources into
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arms deals. By the mid2010s, these
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agreements had crossed the 100 billion
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mark, bringing in advanced fighter jets,
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missile defense systems, and heavy
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armor. It was not just about buying
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weapons. It was about anchoring Saudi
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security inside the American system. And
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then there was the oil, quietly
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reinforcing everything in the
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background. Saudi Arabia remained the
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world's swing producer, able to raise or
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cut output to stabilize global prices.
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That gave Washington confidence that
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even if Iran disrupted the supply, the
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market could be balanced. So energy
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became a part of the strategy, tying
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economic power directly into military
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positioning. At the same time, another
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alignment took shape, more quietly, but
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just as important. Israel, though not
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formally allied with Saudi Arabia, found
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itself moving in the same direction.
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Both saw Iran as the central threat.
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Intelligence cooperation grew behind the
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scenes, especially around groups like
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Hezbollah and Iran's nuclear ambitions.
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Even as early as the 2000s, reports of
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back channel contacts were surfacing,
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laying the groundwork for deeper
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coordination later on. What emerged was
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a counter network with Saudi Arabia at
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the center, backed by American military
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power, financial leverage, and quiet
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Israeli support. The rivalry was no
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longer just between these two countries.
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It had become a wider contest shaping
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the region. One of the main forces
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pulling that counter network together so
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tightly was Iran's steady push towards
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nuclear capability. Now, Tehran has
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always maintained that its program was
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for peaceful use. Things like
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electricity generation and medical
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isotopes. But outside of Iran, that
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argument never fully convinced anyone.
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From the early 2000s, concerns kept
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growing as evidence emerged for hidden
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facilities, expanded centrifuge
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programs, and uranium enrichment levels
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that went far beyond what a civilian
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program would require. And this is where
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the timeline starts to matter. After the
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Iraq war removed a major regional check
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on Iran, the program began to move
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faster. By the time inspectors uncovered
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sites like Natan's nuclear facility and
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Ford fuel enrichment plant, Iran had
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already made significant progress. That
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discovery changed how the region viewed
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Tehran's intentions. In 2015, the joint
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comprehensive plan of action brought
|
||||
temporary relief. Sanctions were eased
|
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and Iran agreed to limit its enrichment.
|
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For a moment, it looked like the issue
|
||||
might stabilize. But in Riyad, there was
|
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a deep skepticism from the start. Saudi
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leaders saw the deal as a pause, not a
|
||||
solution. Something that allowed Iran to
|
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keep key parts of its program while
|
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buying time. When the agreement
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collapsed in 2018, those fears seemed to
|
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play out. Iran began accelerating once
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again, pushing enrichment levels higher
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and higher. It reached around 60%
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purity, which is not quite weapons
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grade, but technically very close. By
|
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the beginning of the 2020s, Iran had
|
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accumulated large stockpiles of
|
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highlyenriched material. At the same
|
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time, what experts called breakout time,
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the window needed to produce enough
|
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material for a weapon, shrank
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dramatically, in some estimates, down to
|
||||
weeks. Saudi Arabia, this was not just
|
||||
another security concern. It was
|
||||
something much deeper. A nuclearcapable
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Iran would not just strengthen Thran
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directly, it could also shield its
|
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network of regional allies, allowing
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them to operate with greater confidence
|
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while Saudi Arabia faced the risk of
|
||||
direct escalation. From Riyad's
|
||||
perspective, that kind of imbalance was
|
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unacceptable. That is why Muhammad bin
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Salman spoke so clearly on this issue.
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If Iran developed a nuclear weapon,
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Saudi Arabia would pursue one as well
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and quickly.
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>> Are you concerned though Iran gets a
|
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nuclear weapon about them getting a
|
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nuclear weapon?
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>> Well, we are concerned of any country
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getting a nuclear weapon. That's a bad
|
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move and you don't need to get a nuclear
|
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weapon because you cannot use it. Even
|
||||
if Iran get a nuclear weapon, any
|
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country use a nuclear weapon, that mean
|
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they are having a war with the rest of
|
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the world. The world cannot see another
|
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Horushima. If the world see 100,000
|
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people dead, that mean you are in a war
|
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with the rest of the world. So it's a
|
||||
useless effort to reach nuclear weapon
|
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because you cannot use it.
|
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>> That was not framed as a threat but as a
|
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calculation, a matter of survival in a
|
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region where the balance of power could
|
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shift overnight. By 2025, the situation
|
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reached a boiling point. Israel, with
|
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Washington's backing, moved beyond
|
||||
covert cyber campaigns and stepped into
|
||||
direct military action. The strikes were
|
||||
part of an Israeli coordinated effort to
|
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hit Iran's most sensitive nuclear
|
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infrastructure. The targets were not
|
||||
random. Natans, long the centerpiece of
|
||||
Iran's enrichment program, was struck
|
||||
with precise munitions aimed at
|
||||
disabling advanced centrifuge halls. For
|
||||
Dao, buried under a mountain near K and
|
||||
designed to withstand air strikes, was
|
||||
attacked with bunker buster ordinance.
|
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Facilities near East Vahan, including
|
||||
uranium conversion sites and research
|
||||
centers, were also hit. The strikes were
|
||||
supported by US intelligence, satellite
|
||||
surveillance, and logistical
|
||||
coordination, though Washington stopped
|
||||
short of deploying its own aircraft. The
|
||||
campaign echoed earlier efforts like
|
||||
stuckset in 2010, the cyber operation
|
||||
that destroyed hundreds of centrifuges,
|
||||
and the 2021 sabotage at Natans that
|
||||
knocked out power systems. But 2025
|
||||
marked the first time Israel openly
|
||||
escalated to sustained air strikes
|
||||
across multiple sites. Analysts
|
||||
estimated that the attacks destroyed or
|
||||
disabled hundreds of centrifuges and set
|
||||
back enrichment capacity by at least 2
|
||||
to 3 years. Yet, the strikes did not
|
||||
eliminate the program. Iran has
|
||||
dispersed much of its infrastructure,
|
||||
hardened facilities like Forau, and
|
||||
stockpiled enriched uranium in multiple
|
||||
locations. Within months, inspectors
|
||||
reported that Iran was still holding
|
||||
over 120 kg of uranium enriched to 60%,
|
||||
enough to shorten breakout time to mere
|
||||
weeks. Thrron responded defiantly,
|
||||
accelerating the work at undisclosed
|
||||
sites and restricting international
|
||||
inspectors further. For Saudi Arabia,
|
||||
the strikes were both a relief and a
|
||||
warning. Relief because Israel had acted
|
||||
on what Riyad saw as an existential
|
||||
threat. Warning because even after such
|
||||
a heavy blow, Iran's nuclear capability
|
||||
remained alive. The nightmare of a
|
||||
nuclearcapable Iran had not been erased,
|
||||
only delayed. And that delay came with a
|
||||
risk of retaliation, proxy escalation,
|
||||
and the possibility that Iran would
|
||||
double down underground, making the next
|
||||
round even harder to stop. This is why
|
||||
the nuclear issue sits at the very
|
||||
center of the rivalry. It is not just
|
||||
about centrifuges and enrichment levels.
|
||||
It is about the balance of power across
|
||||
the Gulf, the credibility of alliances,
|
||||
and the fear that one breakthrough in
|
||||
Iran could trigger a regional arms race
|
||||
that lasts for decades. For Saudi
|
||||
Arabia, stopping that outcome is not
|
||||
just one priority among many. It is at
|
||||
the core of how it sees its own security
|
||||
and its place in the region. That same
|
||||
drive to contain Iran's expanding threat
|
||||
pushed the rivalry straight into open
|
||||
battlegrounds across the region. If this
|
||||
nuclear shadow and all the proxy chaos
|
||||
has you hooked, smash that like button
|
||||
and subscribe. We're just getting into
|
||||
the really messy parts. From there, the
|
||||
conflict settled into specific
|
||||
battlegrounds and Yemen quickly became
|
||||
one of the most important. Look at the
|
||||
map and you can see why Iran made this
|
||||
country a battlefield. Yemen sits along
|
||||
the Saudi Arabia southern border and it
|
||||
straddles the Bob al- Mandeb straight, a
|
||||
choke point through which nearly 10% of
|
||||
global trade and oil shipments pass.
|
||||
Influence there meant pressure right on
|
||||
the kingdom's doorstep and leverage over
|
||||
one of the world's most critical
|
||||
shipping routes. In other words, the
|
||||
perfect location. This is where the
|
||||
Houthis rose as a powerful force. Backed
|
||||
by Iran, they expanded their reach from
|
||||
Sada into the capital SA by 2014. Once
|
||||
again, Iran did not deploy large armies.
|
||||
It relied on a lowcost, high impact
|
||||
toolkit. Ballistic missiles, drones
|
||||
capable of striking hundreds of
|
||||
kilometers inside Saudi territory,
|
||||
training, and sustained financial
|
||||
support. Saudi Arabia responded in 2015
|
||||
with a military intervention called
|
||||
Operation Decisive Storm, mobilizing
|
||||
over 100 fighter jets, 150,000 troops,
|
||||
and coalition partners from nine
|
||||
countries to push the Houthis back and
|
||||
restore a friendly government. Then the
|
||||
conflict delivered a shock that spread
|
||||
far beyond the region. In September of
|
||||
2019, coordinated drone and cruise
|
||||
missile attacks hit the massive Abk oil
|
||||
processing facility and the Karayas oil
|
||||
field. Upcake alone handles about 7
|
||||
million barrels of oil per day, nearly
|
||||
half of Saudi Arabia's production
|
||||
capacity. Almost overnight, Saudi output
|
||||
dropped by 5.7 million barrels per day,
|
||||
roughly 5% of global supply. Oil prices
|
||||
spiked by 20% in a single day, the
|
||||
largest jump in decades. Tanker
|
||||
insurance costs soared, and the world
|
||||
was reminded how fragile the energy
|
||||
supply could be when a single strike in
|
||||
the desert reverberates across global
|
||||
markets. And that moment highlighted
|
||||
something important. Iran did not need a
|
||||
direct invasion to create serious
|
||||
damage. Yemen became a pressure point,
|
||||
sitting right on Saudi Arabia's border.
|
||||
But behind the strategy was a
|
||||
devastating human cost. The war
|
||||
triggered what the US called the world's
|
||||
worst humanitarian crisis. Famine took
|
||||
hold across large areas. Medical systems
|
||||
collapsed. By 2022, estimates placed the
|
||||
total death toll from fighting, hunger,
|
||||
and disease at over 377,000
|
||||
with 70% of those deaths being children
|
||||
under the age of five. More than four
|
||||
million people were displaced. And 80%
|
||||
of Yemen's population, which is over 24
|
||||
million, required humanitarian
|
||||
assistance. For millions, this was not
|
||||
about geopolitics. It was about daily
|
||||
survival, empty plates, and lives cut
|
||||
short before they could fully begin. At
|
||||
the same time, another front burned just
|
||||
as intensely. In Syria, when the
|
||||
government faced collapse, Iran stepped
|
||||
in heavily to support Bashar al-Assad.
|
||||
It deployed thousands of Revolutionary
|
||||
Guard advisers and special units,
|
||||
funneled billions in financial aid, and
|
||||
worked closely with Hezbollah fighters
|
||||
on the ground. By 2013, Hezbollah had
|
||||
committed over 7,000 combatants to
|
||||
Syria, playing a decisive role in
|
||||
battles like Kusair. Iran also mobilized
|
||||
Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan,
|
||||
and Pakistan, creating a transnational
|
||||
force that gave Assad critical manpower
|
||||
when his army was crumbling. Saudi
|
||||
Arabia backed opposing forces,
|
||||
channeling money and weapons into rebel
|
||||
groups through covert networks.
|
||||
Alongside Turke and Qatar, Riyad sought
|
||||
to weaken Assad and deny Iran its
|
||||
foothold. For Iran, however, Syria was
|
||||
not just one battlefield. It was a
|
||||
critical link, a corridor that connected
|
||||
Thran to Baghdad, Damascus, and
|
||||
ultimately Hezbollah in Lebanon.
|
||||
Securing it meant long-term strategic
|
||||
depth and direct access to the
|
||||
Mediterranean, a prize that reshaped the
|
||||
balance of power in the Levant. But the
|
||||
cost was enormous. The Syrian war became
|
||||
one of the deadliest conflicts in the
|
||||
21st century. Over half a million people
|
||||
were killed according to UN estimates
|
||||
and more than 6.8 million fled the
|
||||
country as refugees with another 6
|
||||
million displaced internally. Entire
|
||||
cities such as Aleppo, Holmes, and Raqqa
|
||||
were reduced to rubble. Chemical weapons
|
||||
were used repeatedly, drawing
|
||||
international outrage. The economy
|
||||
collapsed with GDP shrinking by more
|
||||
than 60% between 2011 and 2016. The war
|
||||
dragged on for years, leaving deep scars
|
||||
across generations and creating a
|
||||
humanitarian crisis that reverberated
|
||||
far beyond Syria's borders. And yet,
|
||||
beneath the shifting alliances and the
|
||||
devastation, the core dynamic remained
|
||||
the same. Syria was another stage where
|
||||
Iran and Saudi Arabia fought through
|
||||
proxies, each determined to deny the
|
||||
other victory. Strip away the layers,
|
||||
and it was the same rivalry playing out
|
||||
in blood and ruin. Then there were the
|
||||
quieter arenas, places where influence
|
||||
grew without full-scale war. In Iraq,
|
||||
Iranianbacked militias gained real power
|
||||
inside both security forces and
|
||||
politics. In Lebanon, Hezbollah became
|
||||
the dominant force, shaping government
|
||||
decisions while maintaining a large
|
||||
arsenal. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia sent
|
||||
troops in 2011 to shut down unrest it
|
||||
saw as linked to Iranian influence. What
|
||||
became clear was that this rivalry did
|
||||
not stay in one place. It moved,
|
||||
adapted, and spread wherever there was
|
||||
an opening. And every now and then, the
|
||||
tension did not stay in the background.
|
||||
It broke out in ways that were sudden,
|
||||
direct, and impossible to ignore. One of
|
||||
the clearest moments came in January of
|
||||
2016 when Saudi Arabia executed Nimmer
|
||||
al- Nimmer, a prominent Shia cleric from
|
||||
the eastern province. Nim was not just a
|
||||
religious figure. He had become a strong
|
||||
and outspoken critic of the Saudi
|
||||
monarchy, calling for greater rights for
|
||||
the Shia minority and openly challenging
|
||||
the legitimacy of the ruling system.
|
||||
From Riad's perspective, that kind of
|
||||
defiance was not just dissent. It was a
|
||||
threat to stability and authority. So,
|
||||
the execution carried a message. It was
|
||||
meant to show strength at home, to warn
|
||||
others against crossing that line, and
|
||||
to signal beyond Saudi borders that the
|
||||
kingdom would not tolerate what it saw
|
||||
as Iranian influenced unrest inside its
|
||||
territory. But actions like that do not
|
||||
stay contained, especially in a rivalry
|
||||
already charged with tension. The
|
||||
reaction inside of Iran was immediate
|
||||
and intense. Nimmer was widely respected
|
||||
among Shia communities, and his
|
||||
execution was framed as more than a
|
||||
political act. It was seen as an attack
|
||||
on Shia identity itself. Protests spread
|
||||
quickly. Crowds filled the streets. And
|
||||
in Thran, demonstrators stormed and set
|
||||
fire to the Saudi embassy, forcing
|
||||
diplomats to flee. Iranian leaders
|
||||
condemned the execution in the strongest
|
||||
terms, calling it a crime and pointing
|
||||
to it as proof of Saudi hostility
|
||||
towards Shia Muslims. Within days, the
|
||||
fallout escalated. Saudi Arabia cut
|
||||
diplomatic ties with Iran, and several
|
||||
of its allies followed, deepening the
|
||||
divide even further. What started as a
|
||||
domestic decision inside Saudi Arabia
|
||||
quickly turned into a regional crisis.
|
||||
And this is where the deeper impact
|
||||
becomes clear. The episode did not just
|
||||
raise tensions for a moment. It pushed
|
||||
the rivalry into a more emotional and
|
||||
entrenched space. Sectarian lines
|
||||
hardened, turning what was often a
|
||||
political struggle into something that
|
||||
felt more personal and more visceral. At
|
||||
the same time, any remaining channels of
|
||||
dialogue between the two governments
|
||||
collapsed, making cooperation even
|
||||
harder to imagine. It also strengthened
|
||||
the narratives both sides had been
|
||||
building for years. For Iran, this was
|
||||
proof that Saudi Arabia oppressed Shia
|
||||
communities. For Saudi Arabia, it
|
||||
reinforced the belief that Iran was
|
||||
interfering and stirring unrest within
|
||||
its borders. And that is what makes
|
||||
moments like this so dangerous. What
|
||||
might have stayed a domestic issue
|
||||
instead became another flash point in a
|
||||
much larger cold war. Underneath it all,
|
||||
nothing had really changed. Saudi Arabia
|
||||
and Iran were still locked in the same
|
||||
contest for legitimacy and influence,
|
||||
still pushing through proxies, still
|
||||
fighting through symbols, and still
|
||||
operating on the same belief on both
|
||||
sides that backing down was not an
|
||||
option. After years of this draining
|
||||
cycle, both sides started to look
|
||||
exhausted. And that is when something
|
||||
unexpected began to take shape. In March
|
||||
of 2023, something happened that caught
|
||||
almost everyone offguard. Saudi Arabia
|
||||
and Iran announced they would restore
|
||||
diplomatic ties, and the deal was not
|
||||
brokered by the United States, but by
|
||||
China. Beijing stepped in as the
|
||||
middleman, offering neutral ground and
|
||||
backing it with economic incentives. For
|
||||
both Riyad and Thrron, it created an
|
||||
opportunity to reset the relationship
|
||||
without the weight that usually came
|
||||
with Western mediation. And for a
|
||||
moment, it looked like it might actually
|
||||
work. Within months, embassies reopened
|
||||
in both capitals, and the tone between
|
||||
the two sides softened. After years of
|
||||
escalation, proxy conflicts, and
|
||||
diplomatic breakdowns, this felt
|
||||
different. It felt like a pause, maybe
|
||||
even the start of something more stable.
|
||||
The symbolism alone carried a real
|
||||
weight. Saudi Arabia had strong reasons
|
||||
to calm things down. Its vision 2030
|
||||
plan depended on stability, foreign
|
||||
investment, and a predictable
|
||||
environment to diversify its economy.
|
||||
Iran, on the other side, was under heavy
|
||||
sanctions and constant pressure. So any
|
||||
breathing space was valuable. And then
|
||||
there was China, which got exactly what
|
||||
it wanted. It proved it could step into
|
||||
the Middle East and play a serious
|
||||
diplomatic role, not just an economic
|
||||
one. And that is why the deal drew so
|
||||
much attention. Some started asking a
|
||||
bigger question. Was this a sign that
|
||||
American influence in the region was
|
||||
beginning to shift? But once you look
|
||||
past the headlines, the limits of the
|
||||
agreement became clear. The hardest
|
||||
issues were left untouched. The war in
|
||||
Yemen was still unresolved.
|
||||
Iranianbacked militias across the region
|
||||
continued operating as before. And the
|
||||
central question, who would dominate the
|
||||
Middle East, was never even addressed.
|
||||
There was no deep security guarantees,
|
||||
no major economic integration plans, and
|
||||
most importantly, no real foundation of
|
||||
trust between the two sides. The
|
||||
agreement created a pause, but it did
|
||||
not resolve the rivalry itself. So, the
|
||||
handshake was real, but the solution was
|
||||
not. The deal bought time, and for a
|
||||
while, that was enough. But as soon as
|
||||
the pressure began to build again, the
|
||||
cracks started to show. And that was the
|
||||
reminder. This rivalry was never truly
|
||||
settled. It was only waiting for the
|
||||
next moment to resurface. And now we
|
||||
arrive at the present moment. And the
|
||||
tone is shifting again. In 2026, the old
|
||||
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is
|
||||
heating up fast. Iranbacked attacks are
|
||||
rising and the atmosphere across the
|
||||
region feels sharper, tighter, and more
|
||||
dangerous than it has in years. Saudi
|
||||
leaders are no longer speaking carefully
|
||||
or leaving room for ambiguity. They are
|
||||
saying openly that trust is gone and the
|
||||
language coming out of Riyad carries a
|
||||
much harder edge. The proxy battles
|
||||
never really stopped and groups like the
|
||||
Houthis remain a constant pressure
|
||||
point, striking at ships in the Red Sea
|
||||
and threatening energy flows. This time,
|
||||
the impact is landing exactly where
|
||||
Saudi Arabia feels most exposed. That is
|
||||
what makes this moment so different. For
|
||||
years, Saudi Arabia has been building
|
||||
towards something bigger than oil.
|
||||
Vision 2030 was designed as a long-term
|
||||
shift, a way to reduce dependence and
|
||||
open up new economic paths. Projects
|
||||
like Nom rising along the Red Sea coast
|
||||
were meant to stabilize that future. New
|
||||
trade routes and logistics hubs were
|
||||
supposed to help make the kingdom more
|
||||
resilient. But when the shipping lanes
|
||||
are disrupted, insurance costs jump and
|
||||
cargo slows down. And those plans start
|
||||
to look more fragile than expected. What
|
||||
once felt like a distant conflict is now
|
||||
pressing directly against Saudi Arabia's
|
||||
economic ambitions. For a long time,
|
||||
Riad's strategy was built around
|
||||
containment. The goal was to limit
|
||||
Iran's reach, keep the rivalry from
|
||||
boiling over, and avoid a full-scale
|
||||
escalation. That approach is starting to
|
||||
shift. Reports suggest that Muhammad bin
|
||||
Salman is taking a more aggressive
|
||||
stance, even raising the issue in
|
||||
private conversations with Donald Trump,
|
||||
pushing the idea that this moment could
|
||||
be used to weaken Iran more deeply. But
|
||||
that kind of thinking comes with serious
|
||||
risks. Bringing down a system does not
|
||||
guarantee stability. More often, it
|
||||
opens the doors to chaos, internal power
|
||||
struggles, and conflicts that spill
|
||||
beyond its borders.
|
||||
>> You've been rivals for centuries. At its
|
||||
heart, what is this rift about? Is it a
|
||||
battle for Islam?
|
||||
>> Iran is at
|
||||
>> Iran is not a rival to Saudi Arabia. Its
|
||||
army is not among the top five armies in
|
||||
the Muslim world. The Saudi economy is
|
||||
larger than the Iranian economy. Iran is
|
||||
far from being equal to Saudi Arabia.
|
||||
Iran, on the other side, continues to
|
||||
play a different kind of game. Instead
|
||||
of direct confrontation, it leans on its
|
||||
network of proxies, using smaller
|
||||
targeted strikes that keep pressure
|
||||
constant without triggering a full-scale
|
||||
war. It is a strategy built on
|
||||
flexibility. Trouble can be stirred in
|
||||
multiple places at once, forcing Saudi
|
||||
Arabia to stretch its attention. Riyad
|
||||
counters with money, diplomacy, and
|
||||
global partnerships. But the difference
|
||||
in styles makes the whole situation
|
||||
harder to predict. At the same time,
|
||||
Iran is dealing with growing pressures
|
||||
at home. The economy is under strain.
|
||||
The currency has weakened. Inflation has
|
||||
climbed past 40% in periods and youth
|
||||
unemployment remains high. That kind of
|
||||
pressure builds slowly but steadily
|
||||
especially among younger people and it
|
||||
can go in either direction. It can turn
|
||||
into frustration with the system or it
|
||||
can harden resistance when outside
|
||||
pressure increases. So this is no longer
|
||||
just another cycle in a long rivalry. It
|
||||
feels more like a pattern that keeps
|
||||
resetting. Each round sharper than the
|
||||
last. Every pause has been temporary and
|
||||
every return has come back with more
|
||||
intensity. The current moment carries
|
||||
that same feeling, but with higher
|
||||
stakes, as if the outcome could reshape
|
||||
more than just the balance between these
|
||||
two countries. The Houthis remain active
|
||||
near the Bob Elmanddeb Strait, one of
|
||||
the busiest trade routes in the world. A
|
||||
significant share of global trade passes
|
||||
through that corridor. Every attack
|
||||
pushes insurance costs higher, slows
|
||||
down shipping, and raises the price of
|
||||
fuel and goods. The effects travel far
|
||||
beyond the region, reaching into
|
||||
everyday life in places that feel far
|
||||
removed from the conflict. For Saudi
|
||||
Arabia, the threat is immediate and
|
||||
personal. Key oil facilities sit within
|
||||
range, and every successful strike is a
|
||||
reminder of how vulnerable the kingdom's
|
||||
core income still is. The 2019 attack on
|
||||
the Abka oil processing facility showed
|
||||
just how quickly a disruption can shake
|
||||
global markets. If incidents like that
|
||||
become more frequent, oil prices will
|
||||
rise, inflation will follow, and the
|
||||
impact will be felt far beyond the
|
||||
Middle East. That is why outside powers
|
||||
remain deeply involved. The United
|
||||
States maintains close security ties
|
||||
with Saudi Arabia, from arms deals to
|
||||
intelligence cooperation, trying to
|
||||
balance support with the need to prevent
|
||||
a wider conflict. China approaches it
|
||||
from a different angle. It helped broker
|
||||
the 2023 agreement between Riad and
|
||||
Thran, aiming to position itself as a
|
||||
stabilizing force, but its core interest
|
||||
remains steady trade and reliable energy
|
||||
flows. The challenge for Beijing,
|
||||
however, is clear. It can open
|
||||
diplomatic doors, but it does not have
|
||||
the military reach to enforce stability
|
||||
when tensions rise. That leaves it with
|
||||
influence but limited control and that
|
||||
creates a crowded complicated stage.
|
||||
Major powers are involved, each with its
|
||||
own interests but none fully in charge.
|
||||
In that kind of environment, the risk of
|
||||
miscalculation increases. Saudi
|
||||
thinking, however, is clearly evolving.
|
||||
Containment no longer feels sufficient.
|
||||
Signals coming out of Riyad suggest a
|
||||
growing belief that the only lasting
|
||||
solution lies in change within Iran
|
||||
itself. That points towards a shift from
|
||||
defense to a more assertive posture
|
||||
using economic pressure, political
|
||||
leverage, and possibly more. Iran is not
|
||||
an easy target. It has a large
|
||||
population, experienced security forces,
|
||||
and decades of experience adapting under
|
||||
sanctions. But the economic strain is
|
||||
real. So, the rivalry is entering
|
||||
another dangerous phase. Both sides are
|
||||
under strain. Both are determined, and
|
||||
both have their reasons to push harder.
|
||||
What happens next will decide whether
|
||||
the cycle continues or whether it
|
||||
finally breaks into something much
|
||||
bigger. So, what does come next? That is
|
||||
the question hanging over everything.
|
||||
And the answer is not simple. There are
|
||||
a few paths ahead and none of them feel
|
||||
entirely stable. One path is the slow
|
||||
burn we've already seen play out for
|
||||
years. Proxy strikes continue.
|
||||
Infrastructure gets hit in waves and
|
||||
pressure builds around key shipping
|
||||
lanes. It keeps the region tense, always
|
||||
on edge, but stops just short of a
|
||||
full-scale war. It is messy, costly, and
|
||||
unpredictable. But it is also familiar.
|
||||
Both sides know how to operate in that
|
||||
space. But that balance is fragile, and
|
||||
it does not take much to break it.
|
||||
Another path is a serious misstep. one
|
||||
attack goes too far or one response
|
||||
crosses a line that cannot be walked
|
||||
back. In that moment, the conflict could
|
||||
jump from controlled pressure to
|
||||
something much bigger, much harder to
|
||||
contain. Then there is the wild card and
|
||||
it sits inside of Iran itself. Economic
|
||||
strain, strict political control, and
|
||||
growing frustration have already
|
||||
triggered protests in the past. If those
|
||||
pressures build again, things could
|
||||
shift quickly, but even that does not
|
||||
guarantee stability. If the system
|
||||
weakens or cracks, it could open the
|
||||
door to internal power struggles,
|
||||
fragmentation, and instability that
|
||||
spills into neighboring countries.
|
||||
Change does not always mean calm.
|
||||
Sometimes it creates a different kind of
|
||||
chaos. And all of this ties back to one
|
||||
simple reality. This rivalry sits right
|
||||
at the center of global energy and
|
||||
trade. A missile launched from Yemen or
|
||||
a strike near Saudi oil facilities does
|
||||
not stay local. It ripples outward.
|
||||
Shipping costs rise. Oil prices react
|
||||
instantly. Those increases move through
|
||||
supply chains and end up in everyday
|
||||
life in fuel prices, in transport costs,
|
||||
in your groceries. Even people like you
|
||||
who might be far from this conflict
|
||||
still feel the impact. Ultimately, the
|
||||
full arc of this cold war story
|
||||
stretches all the way back to the
|
||||
Iranian revolution. Since then, it has
|
||||
been a long contest of proxy conflicts,
|
||||
brief pauses, and renewed tensions, with
|
||||
each round carrying higher stakes, and
|
||||
sharper consequences than the last. That
|
||||
is why 2026 feels like such a critical
|
||||
moment. The question is no longer just
|
||||
about who gains the upper hand. It is
|
||||
whether this rivalry continues to pull
|
||||
the region and much of the world along
|
||||
with it or whether something finally
|
||||
shifts. The Middle East has lived
|
||||
through enough rounds of conflict and
|
||||
uneasy calm. The cost has been high and
|
||||
it keeps rising. What happens next will
|
||||
decide whether this rivalry keeps
|
||||
dragging everyone else along with it or
|
||||
whether the pattern finally breaks. If
|
||||
you want to stay ahead of the next
|
||||
explosion in this rivalry, hit that like
|
||||
button and subscribe. Trust me, the
|
||||
fireworks are far from over and neither
|
||||
is the drama.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user